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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ANDY GOMEZ,
Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

Case No. 20010742-SC

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. His
petition challenged his conviction for aggravated murder, a capital offense. R. 1.
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly dismiss petitioner's claim that the
substitution of one appointed counsel for another violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel when the claim was waived, procedurally barred, and meritless?
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly dismiss petitioner's claim that the
prosecutor and trial court interfered with his attorney-client relationship and also
developed conflicts of interest when the claim was waived, procedurally barred, and
meritless?

3. Did the post-conviction court correctly dismiss as frivolous petitioner's claim
that his defense counsel had a conflict of interest when the claim was waived,
procedurally barred, and meritless?
4. Did the post-conviction court correctly dismiss as procedurally barred and
meritless petitioner's claim that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by allegedly
promising a maximum seven-year imprisonment if petitioner pled guilty to aggravated
murder?
Standard of Review: A single standard of review applies because each issue
involves the dismissal of a claim raised in a petition for post-conviction relief. This Court
will review "an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction
relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law."
Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, f 4, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 8.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions, whose
text is reproduced in addendum A:
U.S. CONST, amend. VI;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106 (1996);
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Underlying Criminal Case
On 23 December 1991 the State filed an amended information charging petitioner
with one count of aggravated murder, a capital offense, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.
I

§ 76-5-202(d) & (q), and one count of possession of stolen property, a third degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408. R. 115-16.
On 9 September 1992 petitioner pled guilty to the aggravated murder charge
pursuant to a plea agreement. R. 109, 118-127, 129-140. The trial court sentenced
petitioner to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. R. 1-2, 139.
Petitioner never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, nor did he appeal.
The First Post-Conviction Petition
On 7 October 1999 petitioner filed his first post-conviction petition. R. 7-14. The
post-conviction court dismissed the petition as frivolous on its face without ordering the
State to respond. R. 21-22. Petitioner did not appeal the dismissal. Rather, he obtained
counsel and, on 20 February 2001, filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief.
R. 23-28. The post-conviction court struck the amended petition. R. 29.
The Second (Current) Post-Conviction Petition
Petitioner then filed a second post-conviction petition. R. 1-6. The postconviction court dismissed all of petitioner's claims as frivolous with the exception of a
claim that his trial counsel, Mr. R. Clayton Huntsman, provided ineffective assistance by
allegedly promising petitioner that he would serve only seven years in prison if he pled
guilty to aggravated murder. R. 98-101. The post-conviction court ordered the State to
respond to this claim. R. 101.
The State moved to dismiss the claim as procedurally barred. R. 107-09. The
State alternatively asserted that the claim was meritless. R. 109-113. The post-conviction
3

court found that the claim was both procedurally barred and meritless and granted the
State's motion to dismiss. R. 177-78. Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On or about 19 October 1991 petitioner and Jeffrey Scott Heird kidnapped George
Bonds from a service station in Cortez, Colorado. R. 55. The kidnapping occurred
during the commission of a burglary or theft. R. 55, 119. Petitioner and Heird drove iMr.
Bonds to San Juan County, Utah in a stolen Jeep Wagoneer, Id. There, petitioner hit and
kicked Mr. Bonds about the head and body over twenty times. Id. One or both of the
defendants then tried to strangle Mr. Bonds with a piece of itubing and also attempted to
cut his throat with a broken whiskey bottle. R. 55. The two finally killed Mr. Bonds
when one of them drove the Jeep Wagoneer back and forth over Mr. Bonds. R. 55, 119.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The post-conviction court correctly dismissed petitioner's first three claims as
frivolous because petitioner waived them when he pled guilty and he was therefore
procedurally barred from relitigating them.
The post-conviction court's alternative rulings dismissing the first three claims as
meritless was also correct. Petitioner's first claim was meritless because the Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee a defendant an unconditional right to continue with a
particular appointed counsel. Even if there was some error in the substitution of
1

Because petitioner pled guilty, the facts are taken from the plea affidavit (R. 118127) and the San Juan County Commission's letter inviting bids on the defense contract
(R. 55-56).
4

petitioner's appointed counsel, the error was harmless because petitioner identifies no
deficiency in his subsequent counsel's performance.
Petitioner's second claim was meritless because, even assuming petitioner's
alleged facts as true, petitioner did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any
interference with his attorney-client relationship. Petitioner's second claim also fails
because he premises the claim on a right that does not exist, specifically, a Sixth
Amendment right to a prosecutor and trial court that will further his interests.
Petitioner's third claim was meritless because, even assuming that petitioner's
counsel had an actual conflict of interest, petitioner's alleged facts fail to demonstrate
how the conflict adversely affected his counsel's performance.
The post-conviction court also correctly dismissed petitioner's fourth claim
asserting that his counsel was ineffective because he allegedly promised that petitioner
would serve only seven years in prison if he pled guilty to aggravated murder. This claim
was procedurally barred because petitioner previously litigated it in his first postconviction petition. The claim was also frivolous because it was meritless. The claim
lacked merit because, even assuming that his counsel made such a promise, petitioner
suffered no prejudice. Both the plea affidavit and the trial court's colloquy correctly
informed petitioner he could serve the rest of his life in prison. Having been correctly
informed, petitioner nevertheless pled guilty.

5

ARGUMENT
The post-conviction court dismissed petitioner's first three claims as frivolous on
their face and did not order the State to respond. R. 98-101, 177-78, Appellant's Add. A.
It did order the State to respond to petitioner's fourth claim. R. 98-101, Appellant's Add.
A. Nevertheless, it also dismissed this claim as procedurally barred and meritless after
receiving the State's response. R. 177-78, Appellant's Add, A. For the reasons set forth
below, the post-conviction court's rulings were correct. Should this Court disagree that
any of petitioner's first three claims were not frivolous, however, the appropriate remedy
would be to remand any erroneously dismissed claim so that the State may have an
opportunity to respond to the claim, pursuant to rule 65C(h) & (i), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Seel v. Van Der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 925 (Utah 1998) (observing that the
case was previously remanded for further proceedings after the post-conviction petition
was erroneously dismissed as frivolous); Johnson v. State, 945 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1997)
(same). Likewise, should this Court disagree that petitioner's fourth claim was not
procedurally barred or meritless, a remand to allow the post-conviction court to conduct
an evidentiary hearing on the issue would be the appropriate remedy. See id.
I. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
AS FRIVOLOUS PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT THE
SUBSTITUTION OF APPOINTED COUNSEL VIOLATED HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Petitioner claims that the substitution of appointed counsel violated his
constitutional right to counsel because he had developed an attorney-client relationship

6

with his onginally appointed counsel, there was no reason to remove original counsel, and
the County's desire to control the cost of a capital trial were irrelevant. Br. of Appellant
at 6-13. Petitioner fails, however, to address the basis of the post-conviction court's
dismissal: that the claim was frivolous because petitioner waived it when he pled guilty
and he was procedurally barred from relitigating it. The post-conviction court correctly
dismissed the claim as frivolous on that basis. Furthermore, although the post-conviction
court did not rely on this basis, the claim was also procedurally barred because petitioner
litigated it in his first petition. Finally, in an alternative ruling, the post-conviction court
correctly dismissed the claim as frivolous because it was meritless.
A. Factual Background.
The Provisional Appointment of Mr. Swenson
Petitioner was charged with aggravated murder on 21 October 1991. R. 115, 119.
At that time, San Juan County did not have a public defender office, nor had it negotiated
an indigent defense contract. R. 33. Rather, Mr. Keith Chiara had informally agreed to
represent indigent defendants. Id. On 24 October 1991 Judge Bruce K. Halliday
appointed Mr. Chiara to represent petitioner's co-defendant. R. 33, 54. Because the
County had not arranged, formally or otherwise, for the appointment of any other attorney
to represent indigent defendants, Judge Halliday appointed local attorney Enc P. Swenson
to represent petitioner. Id.

7

The Invitation to Bid on the Contract for Petitioner s Defense
Just five days later, the San Juan County Commission sent a letter to the local
defense bar and other interested attorneys inviting them to submit bids for the defense of
either petitioner or his co-defendant. R. 33-34, 55. Mr. Swenson also received a personal
letter from San Juan County Commission Chairman Ty Lewis inviting him to submit a
bid. R. 34, 86. Mr. Swenson believed, however, that he "had been appointed by the
Court and nothing further should or could be done regarding [his] representation " R 61
Mr. Swenson had filed motions and believed that he "had already begun to represent Mr
Gomez in critical stages of the case." R. 60-61.
The Substitution of Appointed Counsel
On 25 November 1991 the San Juan County Commission met to review the bids.
R. 86, 87. The Commission selected Mr. Chiara to represent petitioner's co-defendant
and Mr. R. Clayton Huntsman to represent petitioner. R. 87. The Commission notified
the trial court of the selections, and Mr. Huntsman entered a formal appearance in
petitioner's case on 3 December 1991, only forty days after Mr. Swenson was originally
appointed. R. 87, 90. Both petitioner and Mr. Swenson objected to the substitution of
counsel. R. 35, 62-63, 88-89.
The Interlocutory Appeal
Petitioner, through Mr. Swenson, petitioned this Court for permission to appeal the
trial court's interlocutory order substituting Mr Huntsman as appointed counsel R 62
This Court denied the petition. Id
8

Petitioner Pleads Guilty
Mr. Huntsman eventually negotiated a plea agreement on petitioner's behalf. R.
118-127. On 9 September 1992 petitioner agreed to plead guilty to aggravated murder, in
exchange for the State's agreement that it would not seek the death penalty, would
affirmatively recommend a life sentence with the possibility of parole, would dismiss the
third degree felony charge filed in the same case, and two aggravated assault charges filed
in a separate case, and would not file any further charges against petitioner for any
criminal conduct of which the State was aware, that occurred prior to the date of the plea.
R. 109, 118-127, 129-140. The trial court sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment with
the possibility of parole. R. 1-2, 139.
The First Post-Conviction Petition
Over seven years later, on 7 October 1999, petitioner filed his first post-conviction
petition. R. 7-14. He generally alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,
that he was denied due process because his attorney was "disqualified," and that his plea
was invalid. R. 8-9. In support of his claims petitioner alleged, among other things, that:
1) the San Juan County Commission and County Attorney, Craig C. Halls, invited
attorneys to bid on a contract for the defense of petitioner's case after Eric
Swenson had already been appointed to represent petitioner;
2) the County accepted the bid of Mr. Hunstman and substituted him as counsel
for petitioner in violation of petitioner's right to counsel; and
3) Mr. Hunstman promised petitioner that he would only serve seven years in
prison if he pled guilty.
R. 8-10.
9

The post-conviction court dismissed this first petition as frivolous on its face
without ordering the State to respond. R. 21-22. It found that there was nothing improper
about the county soliciting bids for the defense contract as long as the attorney appointed
provided effective assistance of counsel. Id. It also found that petitioner had not
identified any deficiency in counsel's performance, and that his remaining claims were
insufficiently pled. Id.
Petitioner did not appeal the dismissal. Rather, he obtained counsel and filed an
amended petition for post-conviction relief. R. 23-28. He did not file the amended
petition, however, until 20 February 2001, over one year after the post-conviction court
had dismissed his first petition as frivolous on its face. R. 23. The amended petition
generally alleged two grounds for relief: 1) that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel; and 2) that his guilty plea was invalid. R. 24. The post-conviction court entered
an order striking the amended petition, noting that petitioner cited "no authority for the
preposition [sic] that one may amend a petition over a year after it was dismissed." R. 29.
The Second Post-Conviction Petition (The Current Petition)
Petitioner later filed the current post-conviction petition, his second. R. 1-6. He
again alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.2 R. 3. To support this
claim petitioner alleged that:

2

Petitioner also claimed that his guilty plea was invalid because the trial court
violated rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting the plea. R. 3, 50-53.
The post-conviction court dismissed this claim as frivolous. R. 50-53. Petitioner does
not challenge that ruling in this appeal.
10

1) the trial court lacked authority to remove Mr. Swenson
2) the prosecutor and trial court interfered with petitioner's attorney-client
relationship and developed conflicts of interest by participating in the
substitution;
3) Mr. Huntsman had a conflict of interest;3 and
4) Mr. Huntsman was ineffective because he promised petitioner that he
would only serve 7 years in prison if he pled guilty to aggravated murder.
R. 38-50.
The post-conviction court dismissed petitioner's first three claims as frivolous on
their face. R. 98-101, 177-79, Appellant's Add. A. It dismissed petitioner's fourth claim
as procedurally barred and meritless after receiving the State's response. R. 177-79,
Appellant's Add. A.
B. The claim was frivolous because petitioner waived it when he
pled guilty and was therefore procedurally barred from
relitigating the claim.
The post-conviction court dismissed petitioner's first claim as frivolous because
petitioner waived the claim when he pled guilty, and was therefore procedurally barred
from relitigating it. R. 99, Appellant's Add. A. Petitioner ignores the court's ruling and

3

Petitioner did not clearly allege this third claim until he filed his memorandum
replying to the State's response. R. 148-49, R. 178. Thus, the post-conviction court did
not address the claim until it entered its final order dismissing the petition. R. 177-79,
Appellant's Add. A. Although the post-conviction court treated this claim as a new,
independent claim, it did not order the State to file an additional response and essentially
dismissed the claim as frivolous on its face by finding that petitioner waived the claim
when he pled guilty and that the claim was also meritless. R. 178, Appellant's Add. A.
11

simply argues the merits of the claim. Br. of Appellant at 6-13. However, the postconviction court's ruling was correct.
Petitioner's unconditional guilty plea waived all issues arising out of the
substitution of Mr. Huntsman for Mr. Swenson. The substitution of appointed counsel
occurred nine months prior to petitioner's guilty plea. R. 87, 90, 109, 118-127, 129-140.
Petitioner objected to the substitution, and this Court denied his petition to appeal the
interlocutory substitution order. R. 35, 62-63, 88-89. Therefore, if petitioner believed
that the trial court wrongfully decided the issue his remedy was to proceed to trial and, if
convicted, appeal from the final judgment. Alternatively, petitioner could have entered a
conditional plea agreement and reserved his right to appeal the substitution issue. See
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Instead, petitioner chose to enter an
unconditional guilty plea. R. 109, 118-127-129-140. He therefore waived all issues
arising out of the substitution of his appointed counsel. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d
1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). "The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings, and the
cases are legion, is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all
of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional
defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." Id.
Moreover, petitioner was procedurally barred from relitigating this previously
waived claim. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act precludes petitioners from obtaining
relief on any claim that "was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal," or "could have
been but was not raised at trial or on appeal." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(l)(b) & (c)
12

(1996). Petitioner raised this issue at trial and could have pursued it on appeal, instead he
chose to waive the claim and plead guilty. Petitioner does not challenge the postconviction court's determination that his plea was validly entered. Therefore, the postconviction court correctly dismissed petitioner's first claim as waived and procedurally
barred. See id.
Furthermore, although the post-conviction court did not rely on this basis,
petitioner's first claim was also procedurally barred because it "was raised or addressed in
[a] previous request for post-conviction relief." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(l)(d)
(1996). Petitioner raised the substitution issue in his first post-conviction petition. R. 810. The post-conviction court dismissed the claim as frivolous on its face and meritless.
R. 21-22. If petitioner believed that this ruling was erroneous, his remedy was to appeal;
however, he did not. Instead, he filed a successive post-conviction petition raising the
identical issue. Therefore, petitioner's first claim was also procedurally barred because
he had already litigated it in a previous post-conviction petition. § 78-35a-106(l)(d).
Although the post-conviction court did not rely upon this aspect of procedural bar,
this Court may affirm on this alternative ground. "[A]n appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be
the basis of its ruling or action." Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f 18, 29 P.3d 1225
(quoting Limb v. Federated Mild Producers Ass >i, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969)
(additional citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "this is true even
13

though such ground or theory . . . was not raised in the lower court, and was not
considered or passed on by the lower court/' Id. The record conclusively demonstrates
that petitioner raised his first claim in his original post-conviction petition. R. 8-10, 2122. Therefore, the claim was procedurally barred and this Court may affirm on this
alternative ground.
C. The claim was also frivolous because it was meritless.
Before addressing the merits of merits of petitioner's claim, the State stresses the
need for this Court to exercise caution when analyzing the merits of an already
procedurally barred claim. Federal courts will honor a state court's procedural bar rulings
only to the extent that the state court identifies procedural bar as an independent basis for
dismissing the petition. See, e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989). Should
this court find that any of petitioner's claims are procedurally barred, but also wish to
analyze the claim's merits, the Court should explicitly state that the procedural bar
constitutes an adequate and independent ground for dismissing the claim. See id. The
Court should also clearly designate its discussion of the merits as an alternative holding.
See id. To do otherwise sacrifices the interests of finality, federalism, and comity. See
id.; see also Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that this
Court's comments on the merits of an otherwise procedurally barred claim opened the
door to full federal review of this Court's decision).
Should this Court hold that petitioner's first claim was not waived and
procedurally barred, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed the claim as frivolous
14

because it was meatless. R. 99, Appellant's Add. A. Petitioner claims that both the Ltah
and United States Constitutions provide that once Mr Swenson was appointed as counsel
and began to represent him, the two formed an attorney-client relationship that could not
be disturbed absent a showing that Mr. Swenson could no longer provide effective
assistance.4 Br. of Appellant at 6-13. Petitioner's claim is meatless, however, because
the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee an indigent defendant an unconditional aght to
proceed with a particular appointed counsel, or the aght to a meaningful relationship with
his appointed attorney.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants only the aght to competent counsel
Wheat v United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). Indigent defendants have no aght to
choose their counsel. See, e.g, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 US.
617, 624 (1989) (confirming that impecunious defendants do not have a aght to choose
their counsel); Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159; State v Wulffenstein, 733 P 2d 120, 121 (Utah
1986) (stating that a defendant has no aght "to pick and choose and discharge his court
appointed counsel at will"). "[T]he essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to
guarantee an effective advocate for each caminal defendant rather than to ensure that a
4

Although petitioner argues that the substitution of counsel violated his aght to
counsel under both the Utah and United States Constitutions, he does not assert, or even
discuss how application of the state constitutional provision differs from that of the
federal. Therefore, the State does not address the state constitutional issue. See Harper v
Summit County, 2001 UT 10, f 29 n.12, 26 P 3d 193 (affirming that failure to argue and
analyze a claim under the Utah Constitution obviates the need to consider the state law
claim); State v Triptow, 770 P 2d 146, 147 n 2 (Utah 1989) (refusing to analyze the
parameters of the aght to counsel under the Utah Constitution where the defendant failed
to raise the issue).
15

defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers/' Wheat, 486
U.S. at 159.
The Sixth Amendment does not prohibit the substitution of one appointed counsel
for another, even if the first appointed counsel has already begun to represent the
defendant and the two have formed an attorney-client relationship. For example, in
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983), Slappy's original public defender represented him at
his preliminary hearing and supervised an extensive investigation. Id. at 5. Six days
before trial, however, Slappy's counsel was hospitalized and a substitute public defender
took over the case. Id. The state trial court refused to continue Slappy's trial so that his
originally appointed counsel could represent him. Id. at 6-10. On federal habeas review,
the Ninth Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would "'be without
substance if it did not include the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship."* Id.
at 10-11 (citation omitted, emphasis in Supreme Court opinion). The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a meaningful relationship
between a defendant and his attorney. Id. at 13-14. Consequently, the state court
deprived Slappy of no constitutional right by forcing him to go to trial with substitute
counsel. Id.
Petitioner's authority does not support a contrary result. Petitioner relies on four
state cases, none of them from Utah, to support his claim that he had an unconditional
right to proceed with Mr. Swenson as appointed counsel: Smith v. Superior Court, 440
P.2d 65, 74 (Cal. 1968); English v. State, 259 A.2d 822, 826 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969);
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In re: Welfare of M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); and Stearnes v.
Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 225-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Smith, and English, however,
were decided long before the Supreme Court's decision in Morris. Furthermore, although
M.R.S. and Stearnes were decided after Morris, they both rely heavily upon Smith and fail
to mention the Supreme Court's decision in Morris. See In re: M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d at
152 (quoting at length from Smith); Stearnes, 780 S.W.2d at 220 (noting that Smith was a
remarkably similar case). In 1988 the Supreme Court cited Morris with approval and
reaffirmed that the Sixth Amendment guarantees only the right to an effective advocate,
not that "a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers."
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has soundly rejected the
proposition that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an indigent defendant an unconditional
right to proceed with a particular appointed attorney. Accordingly, the post-conviction
court correctly dismissed petitioner's first claim as meritless.
Even if petitioner was entitled to continue with Mr. Swenson, any error in
substituting Mr. Huntsman was harmless. Petitioner speculates that San Juan County's
fiscal concerns were simply a pretext to have Mr. Swenson replaced with a less competent
and zealous advocate, thereby "chilling" his defense. Br. of Appellant at 15, 17.
Petitioner has never asserted, however, that Mr. Huntsman was not competent or zealous.
Id. at 17-18. Nor has Petitioner has ever alleged that the plea offer Mr. Huntsman
negotiated was not in petitioner's best interest. Id. Rather, his only complaint with Mr.
Huntsman's representation was that Mr. Huntsman allegedly promised him he would only
17

serve seven years in prison if he pled guilty. Id. As discussed below, however, even
assuming that Mr. Huntsman actually made such a promise, petitioner suffered no
prejudice. Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed petitioner's first claim
as frivolous because even if petitioner was entitled to proceed with Mr. Swenson, any
error in substituting Mr. Hunstman was harmless.
II. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
AS FRIVOLOUS PETITIONERS CLAIM THAT BY
PARTICIPATING IN THE SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL THE
PROSECUTOR AND TRIAL COURT INTERFERED WITH HIS
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND DEVELOPED
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Petitioner claims that both the prosecutor and the trial court interfered with his
attorney-client relationship and also developed conflicts of interest because of their roles
in the substitution of his appointed counsel. Br. of Appellant at 13-17. As with his first
claim, however, petitioner fails to address the basis of the post-conviction court's
dismissal: that the claim was frivolous because petitioner waived it when he pled guilty
and was procedurally barred from relitigating the claim. The post-conviction court
correctly dismissed the claim as frivolous on that basis. Furthermore, although the postconviction court did not rely on this basis, the claim was also procedurally barred because
petitioner previously litigated it in his first petition. Finally, in an alternative ruling, the
post-conviction court correctly dismissed the claim as frivolous because it was meritless.
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A. The claim was frivolous because petitioner waived it when he pled
guilty and was therefore procedurally barred from relitigating the
claim.
The post-conviction court ruled that petitioner's second claim was frivolous
because petitioner waived it when he pled guilty and was therefore procedurally barred
from relitigating it. R. 99, Appellant's Add. A. As discussed above, petitioner waived all
claims arising out of the substitution of appointed counsel when he pled guilty. See State
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). At the time of his plea, petitioner was
aware of the roles the prosecutor and the trial court had played in the substitution of his
appointed counsel and he had sought, but was denied, permission to appeal the
interlocutory substitution order. R. 62. Had he wished, petitioner could have pursued this
issue by proceeding to trial and, if convicted, raising this issue on appeal. He also could
have reserved the issue through a conditional plea agreement. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Rather than pursue this claim, however, petitioner chose to
plead guilty. Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly ruled that petitioner's second
claim was frivolous on its face because petitioner had previously waived the claim. See
Parsons, 7$ I P.2dat 1278.
Petitioner was also procedurally barred from relitigating this previously waived
claim. Again, petitioner's objection to the substitution of appointed counsel, and the role
of the prosecutor and trial court in that substitution, were issues that petitioner raised at
trial and could have pursued on appeal. Instead, petitioner chose to waive the claims and
plead guilty. As discussed above, the Post-Conviction Reme^ es Act bars a petitioner
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from obtaining relief on claims that were raised, or could have been raised at trial or on
appeal. UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-106(l)(b) & (c) (1996) Therefore, the postconviction court correctly dismissed this claim as waived and procedurally barred.
Moreover, although the post-conviction court did not rely on this basis, petitioner's
second claim was also procedurally barred because petitioner raised it in his first petition.
The first petition complained about the process by which Mr. Huntsman was substituted
as appointed counsel, and Mr Hall's role in that process R. 8-10 The post-conviction
court dismissed the first petition and petitioner did not appeal. R. 21-22. Instead, he
asserted an identical claim in a successive petition Therefore, the second claim was
procedurally barred because it "was raised or addressed in [a] previous request for postconviction relief." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(l)(d) (1996). Furthermore, even if
the identical claim was not specifically raised or addressed in the first petition, the PostConviction Remedies Act also bars claims that "could have been, but w[ere] not, raised in
a previous request for post-conviction relief." Id Therefore, this claim was also
procedurally barred on these grounds. This Court may affirm the dismissal on this
alternative basis. See Dipoma v McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f 18, 29 P 3d 1225.
B. The claim was also frivolous because it was meritless.
The post-conviction court also correctly dismissed petitioner's second claim as
frivolous because it was meritless.5 R. 99, Appellant's Add. A. A post-conviction
Again, if this Court agrees that this claim is procedurally barred, but wishes to
also comment on the claim's merits, it should explicitly state that the procedural bar
constitutes an adequate and independent basis for dismissing the petition See Harris v
20

petitioner is required to set forth "all of the facts that form the basis of the petitionees
claim to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c)(3). Accepting all of petitioner's factual
allegations as true, it is clear that even if some interference with petitioner's attorneyclient relationship occurred, petitioner suffered no prejudice. Furthermore, petitioner's
claim that the trial court and prosecutor suffered from a conflict of interest fails because
petitioner had no right to expect the prosecutor or trial court to further his interests.
Petitioner's claim that the trial court and prosecutor interfered with his attorneyclient relationship fails for lack of prejudice. To demonstrate an improper interference
with his attorney-client relationship, petitioner must demonstrate not only that some
improper interference occurred, but also that he suffered prejudice as a result. See
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 (1977).
For example, in Weatherford, an undercover law enforcement agent, Weatherford,
was arrested and indicted along with the defendant, Bursey, in order to maintain
Weatherford's cover. Id. at 547-48. Believing that Weatherford was Bursey's codefendant, Bursey's attorney asked Weatherford to attend certain trial preparation
sessions. Id. Weatherford later testified for the prosecution at trial, and Bursey was
convicted. Id.
Bursey then filed a federal civil rights complaint against Weatherford alleging that
Weatherford had communicated defense strategies and plans to the prosecutors, thereby

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); see also Point I (C) concerning commenting on the
merits of procedurally barred claims.
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violating Bursey's right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. The district court entered judgment in favor of Weatherford, finding
that Weatherford never discussed with his superiors or the prosecuting attorney any of the
details or information relating to Bursey's trial strategy. Id. The Fourth Circuit reversed
and adopted a per se rule establishing that "whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges
or permits intrusion into the attorney client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently
endangered to require reversal and a new trial." Id at 549 (quoting Bursey v.
Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1975)).
The Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's per se rule. Id. at 550-51, 558. It
held that "[t]here being no tainted evidence in this case, no communication of defense
strategy to the prosecution, and no purposeful intrusion by Weatherford, there was no
violation of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 558. Thus, to succeed on a claim of
interference with the attorney-client relationship, a defendant must demonstrate that he
was prejudiced as a result of the interference.
Even assuming, without conceding, that the role of the prosecutor and trial court in
the substitution of petitioner's appointed counsel amounted to improper interference with
his attorney-client relationship, petitioner suffered no prejudice. Petitioner speculates that
the prosecutor and trial court sought to remove Mr. Swenson and replace him with a less
competent and zealous attorney, thereby "chilling" his defense. Br. of Appellant at 14-15,
17 As discussed above, however, petitioner has never alleged that Mr. Huntsman was
not sufficiently competent or zealous, or that the plea offer he negotiated was not in
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petitioner's best interest. Id at 17-18. Accordingly, even if some interference occurred,
petitioner suffered no prejudice as a result. His claim therefore fails. See Weatherford,
429 U.S. at 558.
In an apparent attempt to side-step his inability to prove prejudice, petitioner
argues that by participating in the substitution of counsel the prosecutor and trial court
engendered a conflict of interest and thereby violated his constitutional right to counsel.
Br. of Appellant at 13-17. This argument fails because petitioner bases his claim on a
right that does not exist.
A constitutional conflict of interest claim arises when the loyalty of a criminal
defendant's attorney is divided between the defendant and some other interest, and the
division of loyalty adversely affects the attorney's representation of the defendant. See,
e g, Mickens v. Taylor, _ U.S. _ , 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 n.5 (2002); State v. Lovell,
1999 UT 40, % 22, 984 P.2d 382. It is undisputed, however, that neither the trial court,
nor the prosecutor owed any duty of loyalty to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner's
complaint that the prosecutor and the trial court possessed a conflict of interest is based
on a right that does not exist. Accordingly, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed
petitioner's second claim as frivolous because it lacked merit.
III.

THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY
DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT
MR. HUNTSMAN HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Petitioner claims that Mr. Huntsman had a conflict of interest because he knew that
petitioner objected to his representation and also knew that he had to please the San Juan
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County Commission, the prosecutor, and the trial court, or risk being removed from the
case. Br. of Appellant at 17-18. Petitioner again fails to address the basis of the postconviction court's dismissal of this claim: that the claim was fnvolous because petitioner
waived it when he pled guilty. R. 178, Appellant's Add. A. The post-conviction court
correctly dismissed this claim as frivolous on that basis. Although the post-conviction
court did not rely on this basis, this claim was also frivolous because it was procedurally
barred. Finally, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed this claim as fnvolous
because it was mentless. R. 178, Appellant's Add. A.
A. The claim was frivolous because petitioner waived it when he
pled guilty and was therefore procedurally barred from
relitigating the claim.
As with petitioner's first two claims, petitioner's guilty plea waived any claim that
Mr. Huntsman had a conflict of interest. At the time of the substitution, petitioner
objected to Mr. Huntsman's appointment and attempted to appeal the substitution order to
this Court. R. 35, 62-63, 88-89. When he pled guilty, petitioner was fully aware of the
grounds upon which he now basis his conflict of interest claim. He nevertheless chose to
plead guilty, rather than pursue this claim. R. 118-27. Therefore, petitioner waived this
claim. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). The post-conviction court
correctly dismissed this previously waived claim as frivolous. R. 178, Appellant's Add.
A.
Petitioner was also procedurally barred from relitigating this previously waived
claim. Petitioner raised this claim at trial when he objected to Mr. Huntsman's
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appointment. R. 35, 62, 88-89. He also could have pursued this issue on appeal.
Therefore, the claim was procedurally barred because it was, or could have been raised
both at trial and on appeal. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(l) (b) & (c) (1996). The
post-conviction court correctly dismissed the waived and procedurally barred claim as
frivolous.
Moreover, although the post-conviction court did not rely on this basis, the claim
was also procedurally barred because petitioner could have raised it in his first petition.
As discussed above, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act bars not only claims that were
raised in previous petitions, but also claims that could have been raised. § 78-3 5a106(l)(d). Thus, the claim was also barred on this ground and this Court may affirm the
dismissal on this alternative basis. See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f 18, 29 P.3d
1225.
B. The claim was frivolous because it was meritless.
The post-conviction court also dismissed petitioner's third claim as frivolous
because it was meritless.6 R. 178, Appellant's Add. A. Petitioner claims that Mr.
Huntsman had a conflict of interest because he knew that petitioner objected to his
representation and also knew that he served only at the pleasure of the San Juan County
Commission, the prosecutor, and the trial court. Br. of Appellant at 17-18. Even

6

See Point I (C) concerning commenting on the merits of procedurally barred

claims.
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accepting these facts as true, however, petitioner did not establish that Mr. Huntsman had
a conflict of interest.
To demonstrate that Mr. Huntsman had a conflict of interest, petitioner had to
show both that 1) Mr. Huntsman "had an actual conflict of interest/' and 2) "that conflict
adversely affected [Mr. Huntsman's] performance." Lovell} 1999 UT 40 at f 22. To
establish "an actual conflict of interest," petitioner had to show that Mr. Huntsman "had
to make choices that would advance his own interests to the detriment of [petitioner's]."
Id.
Assuming, without conceding, that Mr. Huntsman advanced his own interests by
merely doing the bidding of the prosecutor, the San Juan County Commission, and the
trial court in representing petitioner, petitioner has only satisfied thefirstprong of a
conflict of interest claim. See id. Petitioner did not satisfy the second prong, however,
because he did not establish that Mr. Huntsman's performance was adversely affected.
See id. As previously discussed, petitioner has never alleged that Mr. Huntsman was not
competent or zealous, or that the plea offer Mr. Huntsman negotiated was not in
petitioner's best interest. Br. of Appellant at 17-18. Rather, petitioner's only complaint
was that Mr. Huntsman promised him he would serve seven years in prison if he pled
guilty. Id. Petitioner does not, however, challenge the validity of his guilty plea.
Therefore, even if Mr. Huntsman had an actual conflict of interest, petitioner fails to
demonstrate how that conflict adversely affected Mr. Huntsman's performance. See
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Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ^ 22. Accordingly, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed
petitioner's meritless claim as frivolous.
IV.

THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY
DISMISSED PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT MR.
HUNTSMAN WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE PROMISED
PETITIONER A PRISON TERM OF ONLY SEVEN YEARS
A. The claim was procedurally barred.

Petitioner claimed that Mr. Huntsman provided ineffective assistance of counsel
because he allegedly promised him that he would only serve seven years in prison if he
pled guilty to aggravated murder. R. 49-50. The post-conviction court correctly
dismissed this claims as procedurally barred, however, because petitioner previously
litigated this claim in his first petition. The first petition alleged that "Mr. Huntsman
clearly stated that if I take the plea bargain . . . I would only do 7 years if I would not be
involved in any violent situations and get and education." R. 9-10. The Post-Conviction
Remedies Act bars relitigation of a claim raised in a previous petition. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-35a-106(l)(d) (1996). Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed this
claim as procedurally barred.
B. The claim was meritless.
The post-conviction court also found that even if were to consider the merits of
petitioner's fourth claim, the claim failed because "whatever Hunstman may have said,
[petitioner] understood before he pled guilty that he could serve up to life in prison and
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the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole would decide the length of his sentence." R. 178,
Appellant's Add. A. This ruling was also correct.7
The standard of proof necessary to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is extremely heavy. To prevail on such a claim, petitioner must meet the two-part
test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), and
adopted by this Court in Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997). Petitioner
must establish that: 1) his attorney's performance was deficient, and 2) the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In addition, where the
claim is that a guilty plea resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must also show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985). In Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1072 (10th
Cir. 2001), the Tenth Circuit explained that "a petitioner's 'mere allegation' that he would
have insisted on trial but for his counsel's errors, although necessary, is ultimately
insufficient to entitle him to relief." (citing United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1571
(10th Cir. 1993)). Rather, a reviewing court should look "to the factual circumstances
surrounding the plea to determine whether the petition*:" would have proceeded to trial."
Id. In petitioner's case, the factual circumstances of his plea demonstrate that even

See Point I (C) concerning commenting on the merits of procedurally barred
claims.
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without Mr. Huntsman's alleged promise, petitioner would not have insisted on going to
trial on a capital charge.
When petitioner entered his plea he understood that he could spend the rest of his
life in prison by pleading guilty to aggravated murder Petitioner's plea affidavit
informed him that the penalty for the cnme of aggravated murder was either death or life
impnsonment. R. 119. It also stated that the plea agreement contained a specific
provision that the State would not seek the death penalty, but would instead recommend
life impnsonment with the possibility of parole R 122. Petitioner acknowledged in his
affidavit that "any opinions which my attorney, the prosecutor or any other person may
have expressed to me as to what they believe the Court may do with respect to sentencing
are not binding upon the Court." R. 123. Dunng the plea colloquy, the tnal court also
informed petitioner that "the maximum sentence that I can impose or can be imposed
would be a term of life impnsonment." R. 137. When the tnal court asked petitioner
whether he understood that the maximum sentence was life impnsonment and that
imposition of that maximum sentence was entirely the prerogative of the tnal court,
petitioner responded that he understood. Id. Thus, even assuming that Mr. Huntsman
made the alleged seven-year promise, both petitioner's plea affidavit and colloquy
informed him that Mr. Huntsman's alleged advice was incorrect and he could actually
spend the rest of his life in pnson from his cnme.
The factual circumstances of petitioner's plea therefore establish that even without
Mr. Huntsman's alleged seven-year promise, petitioner still would have pled guilty and
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would not have proceeded to trial. As discussed above, petitioner knew that by pleading
guilty to aggravated murder he could spend the rest of his life in prison, regardless of
what Mr. Huntsman had allegedly promised. He nevertheless pled guilty. Therefore, his
present claim that he would have gone to trial, but for the alleged seven-year promise,
rings hollow. Accordingly, the post-conviction court correctly determined that this claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel failed for lack of prejudice.
CONCLUSION
All of petitioner's claims were either frivolous on their face, procedurally barred,
or meritless. Therefore, this Court should affirm the dismissal of the petition.
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ADDENDUM A

U.S. CONST, amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . the assistance of
counsel for his defence.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-106 (1996):

(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could
have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that
the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise
that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Utah R. Civ. P. 65C:
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief
filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition
with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was
entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may order
a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court
may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or
witnesses.
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has
in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the
legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except
for good cause shown. The petition shall state:

(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the
dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case
number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim
to relief;
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation
of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate
proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of the appeal;
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those
proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of the prior proceeding; and
(6) if
itioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the
reasons
.ne evidence could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be
addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to
the petition:
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the
direct appeal of the petitioner's case;
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other
civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum,
two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(0 Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it
to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not
available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course.

(g) (1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge s hall review the petition, and,
if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or
if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an
order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the
claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner.
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The
order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in
the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the
filing of the petition.
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or
failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the
petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant one additional 20 day
period to amend for good cause shown.
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition
in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part
of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions
of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition,
attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge
to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the
Attorney General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner.
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for
service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such
other period of time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise
respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the
answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30
days (plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No
further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.

(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a
hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing
conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on
the merits of the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may:
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented
at the evidentiary hearing.
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing
conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may
be conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing. The petitioner shall be
present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be
present in court during the proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the
correctional facility where the petitioner is confined.
(1) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the
court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that
discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to be admissible at an
evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain
any relevant transcript or court records.
(m) Orders; stay.
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact
and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for
a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the
respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will
pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter
the stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken,
the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner
the order to release the petitioner.
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the
trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing,
custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and proper.

(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d),
to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the
costs to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner
is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and sections 21-7-3
through 21-7-4.7 govern the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall
determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs.
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to
and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the
statutes governing appeals to those courts.

